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1. Introduction 
The release of the Report of the Special Joint Committee' on November 15 represents 
an important milestone in the Liberal government's commitment to review the 
principles6 objectives, and priorities that should underlie its foreign policy. The 
review proem itself, while limited by an immense task and short deadlines, was 
consistent with the government's commitment to openly consult Canadians in its 
foreign policy making. Indeed, NGOs in general and CCIC members specifically, 
can take pride in the strength and consistency of their contributions to the review. 
In no small measure, the Committee has taken account of these views at many points 
in its Report. There are some strong recommendations and accompanying analysis 
for NGOs and others to promote with government to develop further and implement. 
At the same time, Canadian NGOs can only be deeply disappointed in the issues 
upon which the Report chooses to focus its attention, in its lack of a comprehensive 
framework for Canada's international relations, and in the paucity of concrete, bold 
recommendations in many key areas.. 
CCIC circulated a preliminary analysis of the Report on November 16. The analysis 
below takes a more in-depth look at the Report's approach to foreign policy, its 
strengths and weakness, and its recommendations. Our point of reference is the 
agenda and strategy outlined in CCIC's brief, Building and Sustaining Global 
Justice. We also propose some directions for ongoing consultations with government 
as it considers the Report and sets out its foreign policy agenda (in January 1995). 
2. The Context and Framework for Canadian Foreign Policy 
In its opening chapter, the Report quotes favourably the comment by CCICs Executive 
Director, Betty Plewes, that "the national interest has a vast global dimension.... We think 
this moment calls for us to be cooperative international citizens" (9). The Committee 
All refer xs b the Report of the Committee are reference to the majority Report. We 
aclmowledge that there we two minority Reports released smnlmnoous so this Report which may take 
up some of the points we make below. We i ovide some commaua on these two Reports at the end 
of this amlysis. 
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absent and presents a narrow Canadian-centric view of the forces of globalization. 
Globalization limits Canada's power as a nation to act effectively to achieve foreign policy 
goals. 
2.1 Global Poverty and the Challenges Facing Canadian Foreign Policy 
Remarkably, there is no substantial analysis of the growing and changing dimensions of 
poverty in the world. The fact that 1.3 billion people, or 1 in 3 people in the South continue 
to live in absohrte poverty with incomes unable to support the most basic requirements of life 
receives no mention in a section which describes the key elements of the "changing global 
some" and their i ithiei a on Canadian policy. CCIC and many of our members have argued 
that these inequities and injustices, and their link to economic, political and cultural 
globalization, were the fundamental challenge facing Canadian domestic and foreign policy. 
The Committee implies that we have missed the mark when it notes that "the divide between 
rich North and poor South is becoming less distinct and therefore less useful as a policy 
guide" (4). The only other refezcr ere to poverty (in this section) is a recognition that "the gap 
between rich and poor is as great within the South as it is between the North and South" (4). 
But the Committee draws no conclusions about the challenges this disparity presents for 
Canadian policy makers. In their words, "the whole notion of the Third World has become 
obsolete" (4). 
2.2 A Coherent Values-Based Framework for Canadian Foreign Policy 
The Committee properly acknowledges at several points that one of the strongest messages 
it received from Canadians is the importance of a clear values-based framework for an active 
Canadian foreign policy. The Report identifies many of the values commonly heard 
throughout its hearings and suggests that they "can serve as criteria for consistent policies, 
policies that should be principled but pragmatic, idealistic in concept but realistic in 
application" (8). But when it comes to articulating the "New Foreign Policy Agenda" the 
Committee seems to omit reference to values in its "guiding theme" for this agenda, where 
"the most important global requirements for the 90s and beyond are for shared security, 
shared prosperity, and shared custody for the environment" (9). The "moral imperative for 
responsible citizens" (9) is restricted to helping alleviate poverty and contributing to 
sustainable development for developing countries. 
Based on many of these same values, CCIC had argued that the primary goal of Canadian 
deign policy should be global justice and sustainability: Our brief stated that "global justice 
is achieved through the promotion of the full range of human rights and human-centred 
developme t that is =Mduble over the long term and respectful of the planet's ecosystems". 
We had urged that this framework be used to address all of international policy, 
including trade and economic relations, official development assistance, and international 
security. A major failing of the Report is this absence of anX integrating values-based 
framework for Canada's role in the wand which would then be applied to all subsequent 
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discussions in the Report of foreign policy priorities. Yet at different points in the report the 
Committee refers to key goals for Canada. (see Figure 1) Properly ordered and plied, these 
goals might have provided the missing framework. 
Figure 1: The Goals of Canadian Foreign Policy 
1. "...[The most important global requirements for the 90s and beyond are for 
shared security, shared prosperity, and shared custody for the environment" (9). "The Committee 
recommends that Canadian policy be driven by the need to protect our vital interests: the preservation of 
Canadian sovereignty and independence, and the capacity to play the ant of active and independent role 
in the world that Canadians demand... " (77) 
3. "In the next century the key to Canada's involvement in the global 
economy will be its ability to build mutually rewarding trade and investment links with the new trading 
giants who will be our neighbours to the east, to the north and to the west. To do this we need a 
genuinely international orientation for Canadian business that can see the world beyond the confines of 
North America." (29) 
4. "The Committee is convinced that sustainable development is of key 
importance as an overarching foreign policy theme." (41) "Sustainable development is important to the 
well-being of individual Canadians, and to our national, regional and global security. It is 
linked to our trade and economic relations. It is pat of the identity that we project abroad. It is the 
basis for our development cooperation." (42) 
5. "The Committee affirms that the primary purpose of Canadian Official 
Development Assistance is to reduce poverty by providing effective assistance to the poorest people, in 
those countries that most need and can use our help." (48) 
6. I an Rigs: 'The Committee affirms that human rights, good governance and democratic 
development arc universal values that should find central expression in Canadian foreign policy, 
influencing and guiding other seas of policy. Canada should seek to promote the global respect of these 
values through a wide range of instruments, including dialogue and programs of cooperation." (54) 
7. Qd= (Chapter on Projecting Canadian Culture and Learning Abroad): 'Ihe projection of 
Canadian culture and learning abroad should be regarded as a fundamental dimension of Canadian 
foreign policy." (61) "The Committee strongly recommends that international cultural, scientific, and 
educational affairs mould be treated as a fundamental dimension of Canadian foreign policy." (65) 
8. "The future trust of Canadian foreign policy should be "directed multilateralism", 
targeted at the multilateral institutions best suited to Canadian requirements." (81) "k should ...be a 
primary objective of Canadian foreign policy to help develop [a multilateral] rules-based [international] 
system in arum of concern to Canadians." (2) "...[I]t is clearly in Canada's interests to do what it canto 
resist being marginalized in North America, to build as many bridges as possible between continents, 
and to prevent the formation of rival blocs." (81) 
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The seeming absence (and partial presence) of a framework is key to understanding much of 
our concerns regarding the wide range of recommendations which the Committee puts 
forward. The statements are positive but lack integration. To grasp the reason for this 
absence one mist search through the report for other rationales for the Committee's approach 
to Canada's international relations. The most comprehensive outline of the Committee's 
approach is in Chapter 7, "Where Canada Fits In". Here it becomes clear that this approach 
is rooted in a move traditional ̀ vital interests" orientation to Canada's external policies. The 
Committee recommends that Canadian policy be driven by the need to protect our vital 
interests the pvesevation of Canadian sovereignty and independence, and the capacity to play 
the sort of active and independent role in the world that Canadians demand....-2 (77) 
The assessment of these vital interests is regirnally bmd- "looking from one region to 
another...Canada's vital interests emerge as distinct policy objectives: strengthening shared 
security, promoting trade and building shared prosperity, sharing sustainable development, 
alleviating poverty, and projecting Canadian culture abroad" [emphasis added] (80-1). In 
Africa our interests are primarily "development aid, humanitarian and social justice issues", 
while in Latin America "trade and investment aid (sic.), and to an increasing extent security" 
define our i terests. 3 For Asia,"Canada is interested not only in the economic progress of the 
region but also in its political stability and its security" (79-80) to support expanded trade and 
investment links. With differing interests in different regions of the world and multilateral fora 
(and with a strong emphasis on managing our traditional relationships with the United States 
and with Europe), it is not surprising that Canada's key goals manifest t emselves under 
different thematic chapters rather than as an overarching policy framework within which our 
various interests are analyzed and realized. This latter alternative would have required a 
transformation in Canada's approach to international relations based on the concept of shar+od 
interests and global citizenship rather than more narrow national interests. 
2.3 Policy Integration: Security and Sustainable Development 
At various points, the Report mentions the need to integrate more effectively the multiple 
strands of Canada's international policies. At one point it refers to the adoption of a broader 
concept of security ("encompassing both military and non-military factors". It then focuses 
on traditional security issues. There are similar references to sustainable development as an 
integrating eonoept. On a positive note, throughout the Report, there is a recognition that "the 
ability to mobilize resources [for foreign policy] depends on a country's human and physical 
2 
While the reoomraeodrban appears in a section devoted to Canada-US rdatiois it is applied in the next section 
reviewing Caiada's regional h ew. The eommeidable god be to pr=me Canadian wvw6M aid mdadeace 
is not reooiciled with earlier cmaerns abort the impact of globdization upon sovaeignty. 
s Appaeady w e hone m unlaced in the Caibbem w dis pat of the Americas wanaab m ____ . 
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attributes but beyond that on a sense of purpose that comes from a successful combination of 
national goals and international responsibilities" (3). Foreign policy is domestic policy and 
domestic policy is foreign policy. The Committee has a commendable chapter on "Sharing 
Sustainable Development", where they assert that 
"sustainable development is important to the well being of individual Canadians, and 
our national, regional and global security. It is fundamentally linked to our trade and 
economic relations. It is part of the identity we project abroad. It is the basis for our 
development cooperation." (42) 
It is disappointing that the Committee was not able to go beyond such broad statements of 
intent to an in-depth and practical discussion of these linkages. 
At the policy molting level, the discussion of implementation mechanisms for a broader notion 
of security is confusing. The Report notes that "policies on the environment, trade and 
development assistance relate directly to our security" but at the same time, "they are 
s ly disci x t ... to warrant specific treatment rather than lumping them indiscriminately 
in the security basket"(11). In the same section, however, the Committee has a positive 
recommendation for "the establishment of a high-level government mechanism, such as a 
Cabinet Committee" and "a restructuring of the relevant Standing Committees of Parliament, 
in order to ensure that the various elements of security are addressed in an integrated manner" 
(13). There is no details on how this goal might be achieved. There is no analysis of current 
coordinating mechanisms (or their absence). There are no explanations of how different 
Canadian policies often work at cross-purposes or in isolation from each other. In fact, the 
lack of real coordination between the Foreign Policy and Defence Policy reviews is a case in 
point. The absence of a defining framework for foreign policy in the Committee's Report 
itself limits the potential for real policy integration. 
3. The Promotion of Human Rights 
The Council and many of those appearing before the Committee suggested that the 
achievement of sustainable human development in domestic and international affairs is 
predicated on the promotion of the full range of internationally recognized economic, social, 
cultural and political human rights which have both an individual and collective dimension. 
The Report acknowledged this debate (53) and does recognize the importance of human 
rights issues "as legitimate subjects for international concern, and even international 
. A%A . m" (6). It suggests that "Canada should seek to promote the global respect of these 
values through a wide range of mss, including dialogue and programs of cooperation" 
(53). But there is no focused discussion of this"wide range of instruments" and their 
application to Canada's foreign policy goals. How might they be brought into play in a 
proactive agenda for Canada internationally (and domestically) on human rights? How do 
these instruments interact with and affect the conduct of foreign policy by government and 
civil society? 
The question of labour rights is raised in the context of trade policy. The Committee's 
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approach is a multilateral one but focuses exclusively on the role of the World Trade 
Organization (an organization in which the G-7 will dominate) to formalize rules in this area. 
The Commiuoe's preoccupation with the imposition of sanctions in extreme situations of 
human rights abuse is important. But the absence of a more complete discussion of human 
rights policy leaves the impression that the Committee thinks other Canadian interests 
(primarily trade and investment) should prevail. 
The Committee's approach to democracy and good governance as the institutional 
strengthening of government and the formal electoral process further narrows the 
Committee's purview and integration of human rights issues. They largely miss the roles 
played by organizations in civil society in building democratic societies. Canadian NGOs, 
human rights organizations, and research centres have set out a range of sophisticated and 
mutually reinforcing instruments at both a multilateral and bilateral levels which the 
government could implement to strengthen the participation of people in decisions which 
affect their lives. Without a fuller discussion of these policies and practices through which 
human rights would ̀ Tied central expression in Canadian foreign policy (54), the Committee's k references to increasing democracy, transparency, and peoples' participation 
in structures and policy implementation throughout the Report ring require much further 
consideration. 
4. Reform international Assistance 
The Report offers an important defence of the role of official development assistance (ODA) 
in changing conditions for the many millions of people who continue to live in conditions of 
appalling pmerty, ply m the poorest countries and regions, many of which are in 
Africa. At the same time it r cognizes the criticisms which have been directed at CIDA, the 
multilateral aid institutions, and NGOs and sets out six important steps which we also 
consider critical for the successful reform of Canadian ODA. 
The Committee focuses its attention on a legislated mandate, the separation of trade and aid, 
the reform of oahditionatity, the targeting of assistance, the focus on results, and aid volume. 
These policy areas closely correspond to those raised by CCIC's members throughout the 
hearing process. Our concern is that the elaboration of each of these areas remains too 
undeveloped (and at times confusing). Both a clarity of purpose and direction for ODA and 
a moral imperative that places global equity at the centre of Canada's foreign policy are 
required if fimdamental re6orms are to have political urgency in the face of institutional inertia 
and competing foreign policy agendas. 
4.1 Mandate 
The Council has supported the notion of a legislated mandate for ODA since it was first raised 
by the Wbegard Committee is 1987. Support for this recommendation from the Committee 
is strong and commendable. The Council concurs with the Committee that the mandate 
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should "consist of a combination of fundamental principles and well defined priorities" (48); 
but we are concerned that the Committee failed to clearly set out the principles it sees as 
important to include. The Report affirms that "the primary purpose of Canadian ODA is to 
reduce poverty by providing effective assistance to the poorest people, in those countries that 
most need and can use our help" (48). This is indeed an important goal, but requires 
darification. through accompanying principles and defined priorities. The status of these latter 
principles and priorities in rdatnn to the mandate as proposed by the Committee is not clear. 
Principles relating to partnership, self-reliance and people-centred development are found in 
the current Development Charter. 
Based on earlier references to the centrality of sustainable development in the Report, 
consideration might have been given to a goal statement which follows CCIC's proposal that 
"the main goal of Canadian ODA should be sustainable human development: eradicating 
poverty and its causes and empowering people". The Committee does give strong support 
to sustainable development with an emphasis on human capacity as a framework for ODA 
when it recommends "that the Canadian aid program apply sustainable development as its 
basic policy framework, with a primary focus on the development of human capacity" (48). 
No targets for aid volume are set for this framework and the definition of sustainable 
development is a vague and incomplete list of ingredients (49). These components miss the 
important role of empovverment in realizing sustainable development. The strengthening of 
autonomous community organizations, of women's groups, rural and urban peoples 
movements is central to increasing the capacity of the poor to represent their own interests 
for greater equality and to participate directly and effectively in social, political and economic 
life of their country. 
The approach of the Committee to development itself is never spelled out; it seems (by 
extrapolation) to be understood as a series of mutually reinforcing social, economic and 
institutional policies leading to economic growth, policies in which the poor receive special 
attention as a target population. This has been the approach of the major donor institutions 
and governments, and many NGOs as well, to development for the past three decades. 
Indeed, as the Co.'." uee notes, during this last decade there has evolved "an unprecedented 
degree of consensus on what makes good development policy" (48). However, that 
consensus, largely donor driven, has not been shared by Southern participants in the 
development process and by many NGOs. The latter have questioned the focus on economic 
growth, economic liberalization and the "project-oriented" approach to poverty alleviation. 
Southern and Northern NGOs have called for major reform of current donor policies towards 
the South. In their view, these reforms should clearly address the urgent need for greater 
global equity and justice for the increasing numbers of people living in poverty. In this 
context, the Council called for a reform of Canada's multilateral and bilateral policies to 
promote these gook. Key to effective development programming for poverty reduction is a 
strong policy link between an overall framework which deals with the macro-issues of 
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equality in North South relations and development cooperation initiatives for sustainable 
human development as a societal process of change for the poor. The Committee has 
addressed (sonoetimes in passing) some of these macro issues relevant to the South (e.g. debt 
reduction), but the absence of the broader policy framework has restricted concern for social 
justice to ODA policies and programs. Moreover the Committee does not acknowledge the 
wide-ranging discussions by Northern donors and in the South on the failures of ODA and 
its need for fundamental reform. 
The six program priority areas identified in the Report` are essential for an effective approach 
in ODA to sustainable human development. With the commendable addition of public 
participation these are CIDA's five current interim program priority areas. Unfortunately the 
Report does not give much direction to CIDA on the agency's prevailing approach nor 
suggest how they converge into a reform agenda for ODA: 
a) The target of 25% of ODA for basic needs follows the Liberal's Red Book 
reeoaomendation, while accepting CIDA's own calculation that 20% is now 
allocated to basic needs.-' The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report places 
Canada's bilateral contributions to human development priorities at 9%. The 
North South Institute has calculated that only 5% of bilateral aid to the 10 
recipient countries with the largest number of poor people goes to human 
development priority areas. 
b) The narrow focus in government institutional programming for good 
governance and democratic development fails to address the role of civil society. 
c) The Committee's approach to the participation of women is quite traditional. 
Most people living in poverty are women. Policies are required that not only 
assure that women are equal participants in development but also take account of 
the specific reality of women and the need to change gender-based relationships of 
power affecting woman's interests in all programs and foreign policy initiatives. 
There is also no reference to policies which promote women in senior leadership 
positions in national and international bodies (e.g. the United Nations). 
d) Environmental surstainability here is rather narrowly conceived as a sectoral 
focus on natural resources and indeed the government's own policies on 
environmental impact for all government programs go beyond this orientation. 
4 Basic bona' neeb ( b rise b a mieimam of 25% of ODA); I ' ' nfhee. pod pretence and domoczahc 
daveiapmmt: paeticJpatioa of wamaa amioommLJ wetaoabe'l y; pima mow 6malopmw and pebiic Paetiipaeioo. 
s ibis 20% is a cWbdation bond aoety on aliocadooa wrMk biLatat aoittiooe ptopama and not for ODA o a whole. 
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e) The attention to cooperatives, micro-enterprise programs, and accessible credit 
in the private sector program is commendable. Questions remain regarding the 
impact on the poor of other aspects of the Report's emphasis on private sector 
roles in the areas of trade, the free movement of capital, and structural 
adjustment 
f) Finally, the section on public participation takes no note of development 
education, an area in which Canadian NGOs have had a strong 25 year record, 
with many innovative programming initiatives in linking Canadians in their 
community to global issues. While scholarships and exchange programs make an 
important contribution, they don't often engage the broader Canadian public as do 
NGO programs. 
Overall there is little attempt to relate these priorities to other foreign policy goals, neither 
in economic policy nor through a broad and common security agenda. But the 
Committee's significant roconomwdation that Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade hold regular reviews of Canadian ODA and involve maximum 
partLipation by Canadians will provide an important opportunity for the clarification and 
elaboration of new directions in ODA. 
4.2 Trade and Aid 
Siy, the Committee supports the removal of trade promotion from CIDA's 
mandate, and affirms that "the purpose of the Canadian aid program is not to promote 
Canadian trade (emphasis in the Report). Yet in the next breath, it says that "it is entirely 
appropriate for the CIDA private sector development program.-to encourage trading 
relations with Canada". This recommendation is highly confusing. The recommendation 
to strip CIDA of all responsibility for trade promotion is all the more suspect in light of 
the Report's focus on trade promotion of Canadian business as a key component of 
foreign policy. What criteria does the Committee propose to distinguish the use of ODA 
as trade promotion from the use of ODA as an encouragement of trade relations? 
CCIC continues to recommend that all activities now funded through CIDA windows 
whose primary goal is the extension and promotion of Canadian trade and investment be 
consolidated outside of the ODA program in the Department of Foreign Affairs and/or 
in the Export Development Corporation. In the Committee's own framework for ODA, 
the objective of the private sector development program is not "to encourage trading 
relations with Canada", but rather, sustainable human development aimed at poverty 
reduction. 
4.3 Reforming Conditionality 
Again, there is much for which to commend the committee in its recommendations on 
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the reform of all conditionality at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This is indeed 
an area where NGOs and their partners in the South have made their strongest critique 
of the current consensus on development. These critiques are acknowledged in the 
Committee's Report. and some recommendations are made to address them. 
Committee proposes a target of 20% tied all by the year 2000. However, it does so only 
in the context of an agreement at the OECD among donors. While recognizing the 
increased costs to recipients in tied aid, there are no initiatives for further untying of 
Canadian aid in the Report. 
The Committee seems to recognize the impact of structural adjustment programs (SAPS) 
on Southern people, particularly women and those living in poverty. It's suggests that 
CIDA "pay special attention to their effects on the poor and the provision of assistance 
to protect vulnerable groups" (53). At the same time, it accepts a recommendation by the 
North South Institute "that the reduction of poverty should be a central objective of 
structural adjustment programs, not just a corrensatory concern...." (52). The emphasis 
on the poor is indeed commendable; however, further work is required regarding specific 
oonditionalities to realize this goal. The Committee's only reference is to the reduction 
of excessive military expenditures and the increased transparency of government 
operation. While important, these are hardly sufficient for effective poverty-oriented 
SAPS. It is also regrettable that the Committee's discussion of the International Financial 
Institutions is not linked directly to these on conditionality. 
The Report suggests agreement with CCICs proposal for Development Pacts, "that 
structural adjustment policy reforms cannot be simply a one-way street coming from the 
donors and imposing prescriptions from above and outside without the participation of 
groups within civil society affected by these policies" (53). In doing so, the Committee 
recognizes the importance of placing develloprmerit assistance within a framework of more 
equitable relations between Canada and southern countries. While 
significant in the text, no reooaomendation made on these issues. The implications of this 
new approach seems to have had no impact on other issues arising from ODA, nor on 
security, the international projection of culture, nor economic relations. 
4.4 Targeting Aid 
CCIC is encouraged by the Committee's call to "maintain the current high share of 
assistance to Africa [45%]" (54) and the recognition that "it is possible to see another 
Africa - an Africa of change and transition" (54). This appreciation of the role of aid for 
poverty alleviation and African recovery is not complemented by a similar understanding 
of the development needs of the poor in the other regions of the South. This section 
ignores its own comment that "most of the world's poorest people do not reside in 
countries ckssified as least-developed" (48). There is also no attempt to apply the earlier 
criteria that choices be made on the basis of a focus on the poorest people, the selection 
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of countries based on need reflecting `% oader measures than simple per capita GNP", and 
a minimum absorptive capacity for Canadian assistance (48). Simple geographic targeting 
does not respect more substantive criteria (witness earlier decisions by the Conservative 
government to reallocate fiends in Africa away from some of the poorest countries by the 
Conservative government) nor the range of policy options that can be brought to bear on 
the eradication of poverty around the globe. The Committee does suggest, however, that 
the Former Soviet Union should receive the attention of a broad range of foreign policy 
instruments to promote Canada's interest in peace and security. 
4.5 NGOs and Results 
Despite the many briefs submitted to the Committee from NGOs, attention to the roles 
of Canadian NGOs in Canada's foreign policy in general and in our relations with 
Southern countries and partners receives only passing attention. The greatest concern is 
about the number of NGOs; but at the same time, the Committee recommends "that the 
share of allocations to partnership programs be maintained, and even increased, where 
partners have a clearly demonstrated record for effectiveness and efficiency...."' (56-57). 
It is nevertheless disappointing that the Committee does not analyze and make 
recommendations about the roles of Canadian NGOs within the broader framework of 
foreign policy. For example, NGOs can be important sources of information and channels 
of assistance in situations of human rights abuse. The one except to this comment is the 
saxoommeadation of support for consolidating the roles of NGOs at United Nations foe, 
building on the experience of UNC ED. (82). 
4.6 Aid Volume 
The C bn mktee recommends that ODA volume be stabilized at the current 0.4% of GNP 
and that the government "seek to make progress towards the 0.7% target when Canada's 
fiscal situation permits" (58). This is a recognition of the current fiscal targets of the 
government (which could lead to signfficam additional cuts to ODA in the February 1995 
budget) and the downward trend in ODA volume in recent years. Projections for the 
1994/95 ODA/GNP ratio is 0.38% and further cuts (some projecting 15% - 20% over 
three years) could reduce it to 0.30% by 1997, well below the OECD average. Equally 
important is progress on re rm to make ODA mere transparent in its goal to support the 
world's poorest through sustainable human development 
6 
Tbey V on b uypt dul" mA should be guided by the alemgth and depth of me Cmad w rappoIt bee as 
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S. Building Shared Prosperity: An Overview of Economic (Justice) Issues 
The Committee pays considerable attention to the economic forces of globalization and 
their impact on Canada's domestic prosperity and role in the world. Much of the focus 
on Canada's "vital interests" relates to trade and investment concerns and opportunities 
in Asia and Latin America and responds to developments within and between the major 
economic powers (the United States, the European Union and Japan). Trade and 
investment is seen as the major engine of global change and progress. 
Global into dependence was indeed a theme of many of the presentations which the 
Conic irtee heard during its hearings. At the beginning of its chapter on "Building Shared 
Prosperity", the Committee appreciates that "the wealth, prosperity and well-being of 
Canadians depend also on the well-being of others, in particular those who are the least 
advantaged and whose welfare is most threatened by poverty" (27). Interdependence 
through global trade and investment does have a major impact on the lives of Canadians 
as they do on the lives of those in the non-industrial countries of the South. But the 
Committee's narrow focus on the economic and practical dimensions of Canadian trade 
promotion throughout the Report does not respond adequately to the more skid 
moons of these impacts. 
In situating economic policies within a framework of sustainable human development, 
CCIC in its brief stressed that "economic policy must serve explicitly human objectives" 
and that "the market, when integrated within wider social goals, has demonstrated its 
utility and power to organize production efficiently and to serve human needs". We 
questioned the impact of current trends in the global marketplace and in the unregulated 
activities by trarooational corporations (TNCs) to achieve these goals. In this respect, the 
Committee's approach of looking at economic policy options miely through an 
inward-looking economic 'cost/benefit' prism for Canadian prosperity is deeply 
disappointing. 
The Report assumes that trade libuslization and the unfettered market will reap 
incalculable benefits for those who embrace growth as the engine for development It 
largely ignores the known adverse consequences of trade and market liberalization in the 
South --- the social and environmental costs of unrestrained exploitation of natural 
resources for eaten, the distortion of food security requirements for the poor when rich 
agricultural land is turned over to export crop production, and the resulting fall in 
commodity prices for many highly dependent developing countries, among others. The 
Co.. ' uee's enthusiasm for growth in some Asian economies, and the related explosion 
of internal markets and manufactures exports, cannot be isolated from the well 
documented costs in human and environmental terms. While Canada looks to these 
countries for trade and investment opportunities (and the Report makes a range of 
detailed to expand these initiatives), it fails to bring its concomitant 
concerns for the poor, for environmental integrity and sustainability, and the protection 
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of culture to bear on its analysis of these opportunities. 
The Council and many presenters to the Committee suggested that this development 
model based solely on economic growth is not viable for the South or the North. 
Canadians, along with their Southern counterparts, have a wimmin and vital interest in 
an integrated, comprehensive and fundamental reform of current trade and investment 
practices if we are to avoid ecological catastrophes and the marginalization of millions of 
poor. This interest require a political will to initiate policy dialogue and the transitional 
for such change (for example, in the area of energy consumption and production). The 
Report offers little support for the creation of this political will. 
5.1 A Multilateral Economic Order and the World Trade Organization 
The Report correctly identifies Canada's long term interest in "a multilateral rules based 
economic order" (33). The approach to such an order is largely pragmatic and narrowly 
focused upon recent and important trade conflicts with the United States. In the 
Committee's words, "the strategy should be to' iltilateralize" Canada/US relations as 
much as possible by forming ad hoc coalitions with like-minded countries and bolstering 
multilateral institutions, in the hope of reinforcing the constraints on unilateral actions." 
(77). 
A broader policy framework for economic reform and fair trade practices is reduced to 
questions of normative trade conditionality. "there is an urgent need to develop common 
rules on trade and environment, in order to moderate the natural "race to the bottom"... 
and to protect Canada against the tendency to use the environment as a pretext for 
erecting protectionist trade barriers." (42) The institutional focus for this regulation of 
the global economy is the about-to-be-created World Trade Organization (WTO). But 
such concerns are not even mentioned when the Committee sets out its views on the 
expansion of NAFI'A into the Americas, or Canada's interests in the expansion of trade 
opportunities in AsiWPaci&c. Seemingly human rights, labour standards or environmental 
issues have little bearing directly on these initiatives. 
The Committee acknowledges the important debate on environment and labour standards 
in tame of "trade linkages" (37). As the Report suggests, the WTO will be an important 
forum for discussing the relationship between sustainable development and a new 
multilateral trade and investment order.' But the WTO is not the only forum for these 
debates, nor does it provide a broad enough framework to discuss standards within the 
context of amble development. Moreover, recent discussions on its structure seem 
to indicate a lack of political will to establish open and democratic processes for the 
' It will take piece within the eoote:t of the recnnly completed GATT agreement about which the cammitlee has little 
to say. 
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resolution of these issues. 
A sustainable development framework suggests that employment standards and practices 
should be );eked to policies for more equitable distribution of incomes, land reform, and 
national industrial and agricultural policies that emphasize small and medium size 
enterPrises. Northern countries must address falling terms of trade and negative capital 
flows for many developing countries, Northern protectionist practices, the absence of an 
enforceable code of ethics and practices for TNCs (t ansnational corporations), and 
Northern control of technology, all of which reduce employment prospects for Southern 
workers and affect the environment. Many Southern governments and NGOs suggest 
that the United Nations has a broader mandate and is a more democratic forum in which 
to discuss and ultimately create a multilateral regulatory framework. It is also the place 
to secure commitment to a new economic, social and political order to support sustainable 
development References to more equal and reciprocal North South relations in the 
chapter on reform 1g development assistance might have more impact if brought to bear 
on these economic issues. 
5.2 A New Agenda for Economic Justice 
From the point of view of Southern and NGO concerns for a more just economic order, 
the Report has two useful but isolated proposals. The Committee recognizes that 
Canada's own protectionist measures against exports of developing countries "does 
nothing to further [trade liberalization]" and recommends that "the government seek 
opportunities to open Canadian markets further to developing countries, particularly the 
least developed" (33). At the same time there are no proposals on how this policy might 
be put into place (as there were around export promotion) and the recommendation has 
little to add to similar statements by previous governments over the past two decades. 
Positively, the Committee also recognizes that the debt crisis is far from over "for some 
low iooome countries, notably Sub-Saharan Africa". It suggests that Canada build on past 
practice and consider "further measures, bilateral to alleviate the 
eontiouing debt crisis of the poorest countries" (emphasis added). It goes on to say that 
"such measures should not be at the expense of funds to long term development". (40) 
While the Qoaamittee is to be commended, particularly for its seeming acknowledgment 
of the need for action on multilateral debt, the Report offers no accompanying analysis 
of the complex issues of debt relief nor its importance in the context of resource flows. 
It appears to be an after-thought. 
It is disappointing that the Report does not deal with the implications for sustainable 
development of South North capital flows. To what degree have SAPs in encouraging 
primary commodity exports been responsible for accentuating terms of trade decline for 
many developing countries? Are private inveatmart flows into the stock markets of Latin 
America and Asia a guarantee of future stability in capital flows and investment in 
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sustainable development? 
5.3 Reform of the International Financial Institutions 
The Committee had heard the wide ranging critique of International Financial Institutions 
(IFTs) and agrees that "this is a matter that needs to be addressed as a priority" (37). Its 
recommendation to review the operations of the IFIs is very consistent with one proposed 
by the CCIC and others. It calls on the government to table in Parliament a strategy 
document on the question of reform of the Bretton Woods system in the run-up to the 
July 1995 Halifax Summit of the G-7. "Involving the World Trade Organization and the 
OECD as wef as the international financial institutions, [this strategy should be] designed 
to maintain a proactive Canadian role in working towards a rules-based global economy." 
With respect to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the review "should 
focus particular attention on making their operations more ef ficient, transparent, 
accountable and responsive to issues of human rights, social equity, environmental 
sustainability and public input" (39). The Committee also makes passing but positive 
reference to the Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions (being promoted by the 
UNDP) as one element of increased "international supervision" of international financial 
and capital markcts.(39) On the occasion of the 50 year anniversary of these institutions, 
NGOs and others from around the world have been calling for a reform of the IFIs along 
these lines. 
The Report goes on to make strong recommendations about the re-orientation of the 
Fund and supports a suggestion for Canada to regain the initiative in the G-7 regarding 
a comprehensive security agenda (aid, environment, tranvestment, defence and 
economic policy coordination). It is very constructive that the Committee is prepared to 
suggest that Canada undertake a proactive strategy for global reform in the United 
Nations (81-82) and in the IFIs based on a broad policy framework.' Canadian NGOs 
and others will be eagre to contribute to this framework for the proposed review with 
proposals for reform of the IFIs and the United Nations. 
6. Strengthening Shared Security 
Despite ac kz wledgement of non-traditional, non-military security issues, the Committee 
seems to adopt in its analysis a more limited and traditional framework for Canada's 
security intotests, Involving the use or threat of force",rather than the common security 
approach proposed by many witnesses who appeared before the Committee. (41) In its 
$ 
Unfarua i ely all Nortbern dominated mstiu*ioos. 
' it would have been equally constructive if a similar framework wes articulated and XpW to the coordination of 
Canada's bilateral and multilateral economic, security and development assistance policies. 
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review of trends affecting Canadian foreign policy, the Committee laments that ' regrettably the smaller wars and ethnic conflicts that persist have not only caused human 
suffering but have also ruined business, squandered past development aid and created 
huge demands for emergency relief'. (6) Referring to Rwanda, the Committee excuses 
international inaction in its comment that "it is a moot question whether timely military 
intervention by the international community could have prevented the civil war" (12). 
NGOs suggest that the international community bears a significant and heavy 
responsibility for its lack of an effective and timely response.'° 
The Committee's approach is not too surprising. In elaborating its understanding of 
Canada's "shared security" interests, the Committee describes global security problems 
as "threats". Thus the Report states that "rapidly emerging global problems such as per. poverty, post and the proliferation of weapons constitute growing thr"ts 
to C`anada's securityy" (emphasis added) (11). These interrelated problems "threaten our 
security, our health, our economic prospects" (41). By contrast a common security 
agenda stresses global collaboration between peoples, equity within and between 
societies, and the resolution of the underlying causes of poverty and conflict. The result 
would be an integrated peacebuilding agenda. 
In this Report the task of addressing the root causes of conflict is relegated to CIDA's 
humanitarian assistance program. On the other hand, this role for CIDA is not clear as 
the Committee designates the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of 
Defence to coordinate the management of peacebuilding activities. (56) While 
recognizing the important Canadian contributions to peacekeeping pse, the Committee 
focuses much of its attention in the chapter on "Strengthening Shared Security" on new 
roles for NATO, NORAD, and ASEAN as instruments for assuring Canadian security 
interests. 
6.1 Security Alliances 
Having narrowed its concerns to appropriate responses to the use or threat of force, the 
Committee places its attention on relevant security roles for NATO, NORAD and 
ASEAN and Canadian commitments. Thus NATO "is the only international institution 
in existence with an integrated command structure, standardized operating procedures and 
standing faces available to support preventive diplomacy and peacemaking". It then 
proposes that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), "with its 
moral force, can act as a regional organization under the UN charter and as a legitimizing 
agency for the use of mkary measures, if necessary, to implement UN decisions affecting 
European security." (20) This emphasis on Canada's traditional alliances among northern 
allies seems to belie its strong recommendations to ensure that the United Nations itself 
10 See the response of OXFAM-C=&& to the Report of the Committee in its pro= release of November 15,1994. 
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is strengthened through greater democracy, increased coordination, and effective 
implementation of decisions (81-82). 
In North America, the Committee recommends a recommitment to American military 
structures through NORAD with "a shift in emphasis from air defence to global space 
su vel lance" (22). But there is no reason why Canada might want to take up this task in 
oollaboiation with the United States nor any explanation of what traditional or common 
security interests NORAD might serve. Africa escapes any mention whatsoever, while 
Asia deserves "a more visible naval presence" to demonstrate Canada's commitment to 
protect the Pacific. To protect the region from what is not clear. Similarly the 
recommendation to support a "cooperative security dialogue" through the ASEAN 
regional forum has an ominous tone given the history of ethnic conflict and the current 
of human rights abuses in parts of the region.( 24) 
6.2 Peacekeeping Operations 
With passing reference to the need for a continuum of policies to address conflict, the 
Report places greatest attention to detail on the terms and conditions for engagement by 
Canadians in--- cekeeping missions. In an earlier chapter the Report discusses Canadian 
mediation skills, suggesting a special contribution Canadians could make to preventive 
work. In a dramatic graph (12) it demonstrates the relative costs of aid and P ping 
activities for Son*lia. But the Report makes no contribution to these other policy areas 
in the eontin umn --- preventive diplomacy, material assistance to vulnerable populations, 
confronting human rights abuses, support for community / indigenous processes for 
conflict resolution involving NGOs and community leaders, the arms trade, among others. 
Rather the focus is peacekeeping operations. Her the Committee provides a substantial 
and useful discussion of the rules under which Canada should commit troops and the 
question of resources. The Committee gives support for CARE's call for clear divisions 
of labour and closer cooperation between the UN headquarters, multilateral organizations 
and executing age cies. A significant gap in these recommendations is the absence of any 
reference to the role of Parliament in the decision to commit troops to a UN mission. 
The Committee was presented with several elaborate scenarios for both significant savings 
and a more effective and focused peacekeeping role for Canadian military forces. But 
despite an allusion to a specialization in peacekeeping, the Committee suggests no 
dramatic changes for the Canadian military which, it says, should continue as a 
multi-purpose force. The Committee goes on to suggest that minor budget cuts in 
defence may be possible, but any ant ̀peace dividend" would "effectively 
restrict the forces to their domestic responsibilities" (25). 
6.3 Arms Control 
Many submissions stressed the importance of building upon Canada `s good record in 
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multilawal form on arms control and nuclear disarmament policy. The Report, with little 
discussion of the underlying issues, signals its support for the extension of the Nuclear 
Non Proliferation Treaty which comes due for renewal next year. There are no proposals 
for what role Canada might play as a non-nuclear power in the debate on this important 
treaty. Surprisingly, there are no recommendations on the control of Canadian arms 
exports nor any discussion of their contribution to militarization. Given Canada's 
significant arms exports to Southern countries, the reduction of military spending 
suggested by the Committee as a condition for access to our aid program seems 
somewhat hypocritical. The Committee makes an inm crtant recommendation for controls 
on the production and import/export of land mines. But there is no discussion of its 
implications of such measures nor how they might be effectively implemented. With the 
importance given to militarization and the increased potential for "unconventional" 
conflicts throughout the world, many people would have expected the Committee to give 
more attention to arms control measures. 
7. Projecting Canadian Culture and Learning Abroad 
The Report sets out an important rationale for its assertion that "the projection of 
Canadian culture and learning abroad should be regarded as a fundamental dimension of 
Canadian foreign policy" (61). Strength ng all aspects of Canadian culture within North 
America is indeed an important goal for Canadian policy. This is one of the few instances 
when the Committee recognizes the impact of "the emergence of large vertically and 
horizontally integrated TNCs that control production and distribution networks". It goes 
on to point out that "we are witnessing an enormous concentration of power in the hands 
of fewer and fewer individuals" through cultural TNCs. (66-67) Unfortunately the 
Report does not take this analysis further when analyzing the impact of multilateral 
economic policies that support the expansion of TNC interests throughout the South to 
the detriment of many southern people and their entmpnises. 
The emphasis in this chapter is on the material benefits for Canada from cultural and 
learning exchanges. While cross cultural experience is essential if we are to realize 
cooperative international citizenship, the one dimensional nature of these 
recommendations is disturbing and short sighted. When is the understanding of 
Southern concerns about the penetration of Northern values and cultures into their own 
societies? Where is the discussion of cultural values and sustainable development as a 
concept which is rooted in diversity and cultural appropriateness? Where is the discussion 
of the rights of indigenous peoples and the protection of their cultural values and ways 
of life? What about issues relating to the transfer of MmMm technologies for southern 
development? What is the impact of the new provisions in GATT and NAFTA relating 
to the protection of ̀ intellectual property rights" for northern TNCs in the face of the free 
appropriation of indigenous knowledge and plant resources in the South.? These are all 
issues which deserved some attention by the Committee if Canadian culture and learning 
is to contribute to global citizenship. 
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& Democratizing the Policy Making Process 
Throughout the Report, the Committee makes some important recommendations for 
greater involvement of Parliament and its Committees in setting Canadian foreign policy 
directions. The Report refers to the growing democratization of foreign policy and the 
wide range of foreign policy actors, including the private sector, academic institutions and 
NGOs, who "are contributing increasingly to both policy development and program 
delivery" (6). Canadians care and wish to be involved in foreign policy making. In this 
regard the Committee sets out some important opportunities for democratization. 
There is a recommendation that Parliament review annually Canada's Executive 
Directors' role at the World Bank and at the International Monetary Fund. 
That is a proposal to review a government strategy document on the reform of the 
IFIs leading up to the Halifax G-7 meeting in July 1995. 
That is also a recommendation that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade hold regular reviews of Canadian ODA "including CIDA's 
performance and that every effort be made to engage as many Canadians as possible 
in these reviews." (51) The Committee also recommended "the establishment of 
broader based consultations on development cooperation, including the participation 
of Parliamentarians" (59). 
The Committee suggests that if the government decides to make the National Forum 
an annual event, "we believe it would have been more useful if a broader public 
participation were sought, if a limited number of key issues were identified as the 
main focus for discussion, and if the procedure allowed for more debate on the 
conclusions" (87). International development assistance has been suggested by 
others as a possible theme for a 1995 National Forum. 
The Committee endorses a suggestion in the Liberal Party's Red Book for a Centre 
for Foreign Policy Development (or a remodelled Canadian Institute for Inttrnational 
Peace and Security) which "would identify priorities for analysis and contribute to 
the public debate" (87). The goal of such an institution would be "to promote 
dialogue among government, business, academic, professional and NGOs...", 
including Parliamentarians and representatives from government departments (87). 
These are all recoannendations which would democratize the policy making process and 
make it more conducive to citizen participation in foreign policy issues. Many who 
contributed to the foreign policy review have suggested that the reforms being 
contemplated for Canadian ODA and for the IFIs should make these institutions more 
aeoessuible and transparent not only to Canadians but also to the citizens and governments 
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of developing countries. In an important endorsement of this idea, the Committee 
supports the Canadian government's current efforts to assure that the United Nations is 
more open to citizen participation through NGOs from around the world. 
9. Next Steps 
The Committee's Report outlines some important directions for foreign policy in some 
important areas of international development cooperation, retorm of international financial 
institutions and the United Nations, in peacekeeping operations, and in aspects of 
Canada's international economic policies. But many of these proposals are undeveloped 
and in some cases conandictory. The analysis above highlighted some of these strengths 
and vies. Several steps to address these weaknesses and build on the strengths of 
the Report are suggested for consideration: 
a) The House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade should develop a multi-year workplan to follow up the issues identified in the 
Report in a more systematic and in depth manner that focuses on implementation it 
should call upon academics, NGOs, the private sector, government officials and 
interested citizens to work with them on this agenda. The government should make 
available sufficient staffing capacity for the Committee to assist it to develop and 
carry out this workplan. 
b) The key missing ingredient for an effective, principled and pragmatic Canadian 
foreign policy is the integrated comprehensive framework governing Canada's role in 
the world. To what extent do the principles expressed throughout the Report 
constitute such a framework? If they do, how might they be applied by the Standing 
Committee as it pursues its agenda for policy study and implementation? As a first 
step the Committee should construct such a framework. 
c) The government has indicated that it will respond to the Special Joint Committee's 
Report within three months. This response should combine a detailed response to the 
Committee's recommendation sdth a comprehensive framework which is now missing 
from the Report. CCIC and its members should offer their advice to the government 
on the consent of this framework and how to apply it to the issues of common 
security and peacebuilding, ODA reform, the reform of the multilateral system 
including the United Nations, the IFIs and the World Trade Organization, and the 
construction of a multilateral economic order which brings equity and justice to global 
economic reladons. 
d) CCIC and its members should continue to press for an ongoing democratization of 
foreign policy as recommended in Council's brief As pact of this process, NGOS need 
to strengthen their policy development and policy dialogue skills so that they can 
make more effective contributions to Canadian foreign policy reform. 
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APPENDIX 
Dissenting Reports from the Bloc quebecois and Reform 
It is significant that perhaps for the first time in the history of Parliamentary committee 
report-making, a major report on foreign policy has failed to achieve all party support, although 
it should be noted that dissenting reports have been issued with most other Committee reports 
this Parliament. Both the Bloc quebecois and the Reform party issued minority reports which, 
although supporting a large portion of the majority reports, lay out some fundamental 
differences in approaches to foreign policy. 
Both of the dissenting reports express strong regret at the separation of the defence 
review from the foreign policy review and the lack of any coordination in reporting to 
Government. It is also of interest that both express concern at the weakened version of a 
legislated mandate for CIDA in the majority report and call for something much stronger to 
ensure CIDA meets its goal of poverty alleviation. Notably, neither party disassociates itself 
from the recommendations in the chapter on democratizing foreign policy, including the call for 
something equivalent to a Centre for Foreign Development in Canada. 
Bloc quebfcola report 
The lengthier of the two dissenting reports, this report also expresses the most dissatisfaction 
with the majority report. While its outlook is at times more progressive than the majority report, 
much of the Bloc's report is political and the recommendations catered to achieve what is best 
for Quebec, not the world. The report provides recommendations on the areas: 
international education and culture, which seem to be the strongest reason behind the 
report - they condemn the majority report's approach to promoting education and culture 
abroad and provide a lengthy assertion of Quebec's jurisdiction in these areas and in 
international relations more generally; 
the need to place more emphasis on the centrality of human rights and democratic 
development in Canada's foreign policy, including the development of guidelines. Other 
recommendations include a stronger link between human rights and trade (and argues 
for bilateral sanctions, cutting of bilateral aid and leadership at multilateral fora such as 
the UN where grave human rights abuses occur), support to emerging democracies (with 
particular reference to the former Soviet Union) and the need for a more positive view 
of nationalism and new states (with obvious reference to Quebec); 
the emergence of new international actors, with a particular focus on provinces and the 
role of cities (citing Montrdal) and local authorities; 
in the area of security, a rethinking of our military alliances with NATO and NORAD 
"so that their strategic missions reflect the UN's needs", setting a ceiling on peacekeeping 
commitments and submitting decisions to Parliament on peacekeeping missions; 
on international assistance, the Bloc says recommendations have been too tame and 
suggests legislation for CIDA linked to the mandate and power of the organisation, as 
well as policy direction, calls for more assistance to the poorest countries, especially in 
Africa and suggests at least 50% of ODA for sustainable human development; 
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significantly, for a party which has frequently quoted NGOs and their work in the 
House and in Committee, there is little discussion of NGOs in their dissenting report, 
except to applaud the work of NGOs in developments education; 
In the area of trade, the Bloc believes the majority report undervalued our relations 
with the United States and failed to "accept our geography" (and the fact that different 
regions of Canada will have different trading priorities), going on to explain that for 
Quebec, the U.S. and Europe will remain the most important trading partners. 
There is no mention of developing countries outside of the assistance chapter, including 
on areas related to economic justice or security, although the Report does end with confirming 
"Quebec's humanitarian concern for equity among nations". 
Reform report 
The Reform party acknowledges it is generally in favour of most of the majority report 
but takes issue with the following areas: 
the absence of fiscal responsibility as the report calls for no cuts to spending and in fact 
suggests an increase in support to foreign affairs - the Reform calls for cuts to bilateral 
(government to government aid), international grants and non-mandatory contributions 
and dropping our membership from non-essential organisations. They also express 
concern at the chapter on culture in the sense that it is "a recipe for increased spending 
and big government"; 
in addition to calling for a true legislated mandate to CIDA to avoid the continued use 
of the organisation as a "slushfund for the Minister", they call for an independent audit 
of the International Development Research Centre and the move of CIDA Inc. to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; 
concern is expressed at the foreign policy review process (the Committee and the 
National Forum) having had over-representation of special interest groups and academics 
and the "under-representation of grassroots Canadians", going on to say that "ordinary 
Canadians are rarely asked for their opinions". 
